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RECENT DECISIONS
the names and addresses of those responsible for it the ordinance
is violated even though the subject matter is within the area of pro-
tected speech and otherwise immune from censure. The ordinance
was not limited to unlawful handbills, but applied to "any handbill
in any place under any circumstances." 2S Therein lies the consti-
tutional objection. In order to accomplish its purpose of deterring
and aiding in the punishment of abuses of the right freely to com-
municate by handbills, the ordinance imposed a restraint upon all
occasions where it was desired to use them. The evil sought to be
averted simply did not justify the measure adopted to avert it.29
It cannot be seriously doubted that such an ordinance would
deter at least some writers and distributors. Anonymity clothes not
only the lawbreaker, but also the spokesman of the unpopular view-
point who fears the censure of business and social contacts, as well
as the writer who simply wishes to avoid the public eye. The right
of free expression cannot be said to be limited only to those who are
so courageous or so deeply moved that they will act regardless of
the consequences which might follow. The purpose of the ordinance
could have been equally well served by providing additional penalties
for literature of the offensive class if the author and distributor were
not named therein. It is submitted, therefore, that the Court acted
wisely in striking down an ordinance which encroached upon a
fundamental freedom without any showing of real necessity for
doing so.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-JURISDICTION-FOREIGN CORPORATION
SUBJECTED TO SUIT ON BASIS OF SINGLE CONTRACT NOT VIOLATION
OF DUE PROcEss.-Defendant, a foreign corporation engaged in the
manufacture of house trailers, was sued on the theory of implied
warranty on the basis of a single sale by a resident dealer. The de-
fendant had granted the dealer an exclusive franchise, joined in filing
documents for the dealer's license, reimbursed such dealer for one-half
of advertising costs, drafted the dealer's conditional sales contracts,
sent a warranty policy directly to the resident purchaser, furnished
servicemen in an attempt to repair defects, and maintained corres-
pondence with the dealer concerning the unsuitability of plaintiff's
trailer. Service of process was made on the Secretary of State and
notice to defendant was accomplished by ordinary mail pursuant to
28 Los ANGELES, CAL., MuNicIPAL CODE § 28.06.
29 "Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public con-
venience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but
be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to
the maintenance of democratic institutions." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
161 (1939).
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statutory provisions 1 subjecting foreign corporations involved in a
single contract to be performed in whole or in part within the state
to in personam jurisdiction by state courts. The Minnesota Supreme
Court, affirming the trial court, held that making the foreign cor-
poration amenable to suit in a cause of action arising out of a single
contract performed within the state did not violate the due process
clause of the United States Constitution.2  Beck v. Spindler, -
Minn. -, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
At common law a personal judgment could be rendered against
a foreign corporation only if it had voluntarily submitted to the juris-
diction of state courts. 3  The doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff 4 defined
the limits of state court jurisdiction under the constitutional guar-
antee of due process, 5 which takes cognizance of a corporation as a
"person." 6 Just where the line of limitation falls, particularly with
regard to foreign corporations, has been a continuing subject of con-
troversy. With the recognition of state power to require corporations
"doing business" within the state to appoint agents upon whom
process could be served, 7 and the imposition of jurisdiction on the
basis of acts committed within the forum sufficient to constitute
"doing business," 8 came fictional concepts of corporate "presence"
and "consent." 9 Amenability to process in the absence of actual
consent, however, was limited to causes of action arising from busi-
ness activities within the state.'0
1 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1959). "If a foreign corporation
makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to be performed in whole or
in part by either party in Minnesota, or if such foreign corporation commits
a tort in whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota, such
acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Minnesota by the foreign cor-
poration and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by the foreign
corporation of the secretary of the State of Minnesota and his successors to
be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process
in any actions or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from or
growing out of such contract or tort. Such process shall be served in dupli-
cate upon the secretary of state . . . and the secretary of state shall mail one
copy thereof to the corporation ....... Ibid.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 See, e.g., Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 24 N.J.L. 222
(1853); M'Queen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. R. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1819).
4 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5 Id. at 733.
6 Covington &_L. Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896).
7 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.,
243 U.S. 93, 95 (1917); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
222 Fed. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
8 See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Bond, Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 289 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1933) ; Commercial Mut. Acc. Co. v. Davis, 213
U.S. 245 (1909).
9 Ibid. See generally GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 210-13 (1949).
10 Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 129-32 (1915) ; accord, Old Wayne
Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22-23 (1907).
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The doctrine of "mere solicitation plus" developed with an ex-
pansion of what constitutes "doing business." Solicitation alone was
deemed insufficient activity to subject a foreign corporation to the
personal jurisdiction of state courts,"1 while continuous solicitation
plus other corporate activities was considered sufficient activity to
constitute "doing business" and warrant an inference of corporate
"presence" within the state.'2  The determination in each case de-
pended upon its own facts,' 3 but the rule remained that single,
isolated acts were insufficient for rendering a personal judgment
against a foreign corporation.1 4  Each state may determine for itself
what constitutes "doing business" within the meaning of its own
laws unless assumption of jurisdiction is so unreasonable as to come
in conflict with the requirements of due process or the commerce
clause of the Constitution.' 5
Under the exercise of "police power," states have enacted stat-
utes which confer jurisdiction over nonresidents engaged in activities
regulated by the state for the protection of its citizens.' 6 Although
jurisdiction may be imposed upon nonresidents solely on the basis
of a single act committed within the state, these statutes have been
constitutionally applied.' 7 However, the jurisdictional interpretation
11 People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918)
(continuous solicitation by agents of retail trade for jobbers); Philadelphia
& R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268 (1917) (activities of connecting
carriers); Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 205 U.S. 364, 393 (1907)
(activities of subsidiary corporations); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205
U.S. 530, 533 (1907) (solicitation of freight and passenger traffic).
12 International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 587
(1914) (solicitation plus continuous shipment of machines into Kentucky and
agents authorized to receive payments and deal with state banks) ; accord,
International Shoe Co. v. Lovejoy, 219 Iowa 204, 257 N.W. 576 (1934) (con-
tinuous solicitation plus promotional activity and a permanent display room
for products); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915
(1917) (systematic solicitation plus maintenance of office and continuous ship-
ments into state). But see Cancelmo v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 12 F.2d 166
(D.C. Cir. 1926). See generally the discussion of Supreme Court cases in
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 Fed. 566 (E.D.
Ky. 1922).
'
3 E.g., People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., sitpra note 11, at
87; International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, szapra note 12, at
583.
'14 Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
5 Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U.S. 148, 150 (1925).
16 See, e.g., N.Y. V~amcLE & TRA:Avic LAW § 52 (amended statute explicitly
covering nonresident automobile owners).
17 See, e.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex reL. State Corp. Comm'n,
339 U.S. 643 (1950) (application of the Virginia "Blue Sky Law" to non-
resident mail-order health insurance association) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1927) (statute subjecting nonresident motorists to personal jurisdiction
following service of process on state official) ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S.
160 (1916) (statute requiring nonresident motorists to appoint secretary of
state as agent for service of process). See generally Scott, Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARV. L. Rzv. 563 (1926).
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was limited to the special facts of each case.18 Outside of those
activities subjected to special regulations of the state, jurisdiction
could not be imposed on the basis of a single, isolated act within
the state.1 9
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,20 the United States
Supreme Court discarded the fictions of corporate presence and im-
plied consent,21 and formulated the following test:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 22
This test shifts the emphasis from determining whether there is a
"doing of business" to adjudging the activity in relation to the pur-
pose for which jurisdiction is sought, based on a test of reasonable-
ness and fair play. However, a direct limitation was placed on
jurisdiction over foreign corporations in that the state must have
some reasonable connection with the corporation because of its ac-
tivities within the state. Solicitation alone would not supply the
minimal contact with the state; 23 but the Court also implied that
single or isolated acts may be a basis for jurisdiction if connected
with the activities of the foreign corporation within the state.24
Applying the doctrine of International Shoe, regular and systematic
solicitation creating continuing obligations was considered sufficient
activity to subject an insurance company to the jurisdiction of a
state court,25 notice by registered mail satisfying the requirements
of due process. 26 The United States Supreme Court approved asser-
tion of state jurisdiction in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.27
with no solicitation or business within the state other than one in-
surance policy. Although the state exerts regulatory power over in-
surance companies, the decision was not predicated on the right of the
state to apply its police power in that particular area, but rather on
18 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
19 Ibid.
2326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (dictum).
22 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
23 Id. at 314. "[Slolicitation . . . plus some additional activities there are
sufficient to render the corporation amenable to suit ....... Ibid. But see
Huck v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 4 Wis.2d 132, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958).
24 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, .nepra note 22, at 317. "[S ]ingle
or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities
there." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
25 Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S.
643 (1950). Compare Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S.
140 (1923).
28 Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, supra
note 25, at 650-51.
27 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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the reasoning that jurisdiction was "based on a contract which had
substantial connection with that State." 28 The language of the Court
was almost too broad, and became more explicit in Hanson v.
Denckla29 where, in recognizing the trend toward increasing state
jurisdiction over nonresidents as a natural development accompany-
ing more expedient transportation and communication, it was asserted
that minimal contacts of a foreign corporation with the state are
required for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, and that it would
be a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual end of
all restrictions over state jurisdiction.30
The standards set forth in International Shoe, McGee, and
Hanson provide the present state of the law regarding state juris-
diction over foreign corporations. 3 ' It is essential that there be some
act by which the foreign corporation places itself in the position of
utilizing the benefits and protection of state law.32  The cause of
action must be one which arises out of, or results from, corporate
activities in the forum.33 There must be sufficient contact of the
defendant with the state so that assertion of jurisdiction does not
violate due process tenets of "fair play" and "substantial justice." 34
In the area of state taxation of foreign corporations the broad lan-
guage of the United States Supreme Court 35 created considerable
concern and uncertainty, resulting in legislative action.3 6
28 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 233 (1957).
29357 U.S. 235 (1958).
30 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). "Those restrictions are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States." Ibid.
31 See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
HAv. L. REv. 909 (1960); Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporatims
Based on a Single Act: A New Sole for Internatimal Shoe, 47 Gzo. L.J.
342, 349-73 (1958).
32 Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 30, at 253.
33 Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 30, at 251-52. But see Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).34 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See
Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 30, at 251; McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).3 5 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450(1959). "We conclude that net income from the interstate operations of a
foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is
not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the
taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the same." Id. at 452.
36 Pub. L. No. 272, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-04 (Sept. 14, 1959).
"(a) No State . . . shall have power to impose . . . a net income tax on the
income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce
if the only business activities within such State . . . are .
"(1) the solicitation of orders . . . in such State . . . which orders are
sent outside the State . . . and . . . are filled by shipment . . . from . . .
outside the State ....
"(c) For purposes of subsection (a), a person shall not be considered
to have engaged in business activities within a State . . . merely by reason
of sales in such State, or the solicitation of orders for sales . . . "
1960]
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In 1957 Minnesota became the sixth state to enact an isolated
act statute.37 A similar statute was upheld in Smyth v. Twin State
Improvement Corp.38 where jurisdiction was imposed on the basis
of a single tort committed during the corporation's sole entry into
the state. In a tort action against a foreign corporation for personal
injuries resulting from the misrepresentations of an agent who had
solicited orders and rendered advice continuously within the forum,
such a statute was also applied and upheld.3 9 A reluctance is dis-
cernible toward applying isolated act statutes in libel suits, 40 although
jurisdiction has been imposed in other types of actions when cor-
porate activities were probably no more substantial. 4' The leading
case upholding jurisdiction on the basis of a single contract is
Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.,4 2 in which the
activities of the foreign corporation related to a single transaction,
but added up to considerable contact with the state.43  Both Smyth
and Compania de Astral were cited with approval by the Supreme
Court in the McGee case.44 However, where the activity of a for-
eign corporation has failed to provide "substantial minimum contact"
with the forum, the use of an isolated act as the basis of jurisdiction
is apparently a denial of due process.45
An era of rapid technological achievements has enabled corpora-
tions to extend the scope of business activities; it has also become
increasingly less burdensome to defend actions in jurisdictions for-
eign to their incorporation. The Supreme Court has applied a
flexible standard of reasonableness and fair play to the requirements
of due process, which provides both latitude and limitation to the
exercise of state court jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The
outermost limits of jurisdiction on the doing of an act have not been
37 See Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnwsota over Absent Defendants,
42 MINN. L. REV. 909 (1958). Other states with isolated act statutes are:
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956) ; Me. Laws ch. 317, § 125(1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92(d) (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a)(Supp. 1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1959) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3083
(Supp. 1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 226, § 262.05(5) (Supp. 1959).
38 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
39 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prods. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D.C. Md.
1950).
40 See Insull v. New York World Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D.
II. 1959); Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d
445 (1957).
41 See Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957).
42 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), dissent reported in 108 A.2d 372
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
43 Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d
357, 367 (1954).
44 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 n.2 (1957).
45 Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D.C. Minn. 1959). See
Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ill. 1959); Arundel Crane Serv.,
Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d 428 (1957); Erlanger Mills,
Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
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clearly defined, but it is apparent that the application of isolated act
statutes to impose jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis
of a single contract to be performed within the state satisfies due
process if there has been "substantial minimum contact" between the
defendant and the forum, and defending the action is not an unreason-
able burden.
Although the holding of the principal case is predicated upon a
cause of action arising out of the performance of a single contract
within the state, the Minnesota Court took into consideration addi-
tional corporate activities related to that contract before concluding
the requirements of due process had been satisfied. The minimal
contacts of defendant with the forum represent a degree of activity
barely sufficient to fall within the limitations prescribed by the
Supreme Court as the present scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REFUSAL TO RENEW APPELLANT'S
PASSPORT TO TRAVEL IN CERTAIN AREAS HELD IMMUNE FROM
JUDICIAL REvIEw.-Appellant newspaper correspondent applied for
renewal of his passport which contained a restriction against travel
to certain areas with which the United States does not have diplo-
matic relations. Appellant had violated this restriction on his original
passport and refused to commit himself to abide by it in the future.
The Secretary of State refused to issue the passport. The United
States Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment of the District
Court, held, the designation of certain areas in the world as "trouble
spots" and the concomitant restriction upon American travel therein
is a part of the President's conduct of foreign affairs as delegated to
the Secretary. The basis of the restriction is military, political, and
geographical, not personal, and the President's discretion in such
affairs is immune from judicial review. Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d
905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
In English law, man's natural right to travel has been virtually
unquestioned for centuries. The Magna Carta in 1215 asserted this
right of free men against the right of the monarch to restrict them
to the kingdom I and, by the time of Blackstone little, if any, thought
was given to the notion that one of His Majesty's subjects would
have any restrictions placed upon his travel-within or without the
kingdom. 2 The American colonists undoubtedly shared this view
and article four of the Articles of Confederation stated it expressly.2
I MAGNA CARTA ch. 42 (1215).
2 1 BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTAIES *134.
3 See CHAFFFF, TaREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 162-213(1956).
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